G.R. No. 118651 - PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. AND/OR JULIANO LIM, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING WORKERS UNION AND LOURDES A. DE JESUS.

Ruling

accordingly ordered to reinstate de Jesus to her previous position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the time of her suspension on August 19, 1992. Dissatisfied with the Labor Arbiters decision, petitioners appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its July 21, 1994 decision, the NLRC [1] ruled that de Jesus was negligent in presuming that the ribs of P.O. No. 3853 should likewise be trimmed for having the same style and design as P.O. No. 3824, thus petitioners cannot be entirely faulted for dismissing de Jesus. The NLRC declared that the status quo between them should be maintained and affirmed the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement, but without backwages. The NLRC further directed petitioner to pay de Jesus her back salaries from the date she filed her motion for execution on September 21, 1993 up to the date of the promulgation of [the] decision. [2] Petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied, hence this petition anchored substantially on the alleged NLRCs error in holding that de Jesus is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries. On March 6, 1996, petitioners filed its supplement to the petition amplifying further their arguments. In a resolution dated February 20, 1995, the Court required respondents to comment thereon. Private respondent de Jesus and the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent NLRC, subsequently filed their comments. Thereafter, petitioners filed two rejoinders [should be replies] to respondents respective comments. Respondents in due time filed their rejoinders. These are two interrelated and crucial issues, namely: (1) whether or not de Jesus was illegally dismissed, and (2) whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of execution. Petitioners insist that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that de Jesus is entitled to reinstatement to her previous position for she was not illegally dismissed in the first place. In support thereof, petitioners quote portions of the NLRC decision which stated that respondent [petitioners herein] cannot be entirely faulted for dismissing the complaint [3] and that there was no illegal dismissal to speak of in the case at bar. [4] Petitioners further add that de Jesus breached the trust reposed in her, hence her dismissal from service is proper on the basis of loss of confidence, citing as authority the cases of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 197 SCRA 491; Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 751, and Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, [5] 154 SCRA 500. The arguments lack merit. The entire paragraph which comprises the gist of the NLRCs decision from where petitioners derived and isolated the aforequoted portions of the NLRCs observation reads in full as follows: We cannot fully subscribe to the complainants claim that she trimmed the ribs of PO3853 in the light of the sworn statement of